Much of the background of this invention is outlined in U.S. Pat. No. 7,515,094 and is herein incorporated by reference.
It has been demonstrated that there are significant advantages to the analysis of both intentional and unintentional emissions from electronic devices to garner information about the emitting equipment, the information processed by the equipment and the location of the equipment. Nearly all IEDs utilize a commercial electronic device as a triggering mechanism.
Examples include remote keyless entry devices, handheld radios, garage door openers and long-range cordless telephones. This contract seeks to leverage a patent-pending method of active IED detection through the stimulus of electromagnetic signatures that unintentionally emit from trigger electronics. The active Advanced Electromagnetic Location of Electronic Devices (AELED) system is a complete system comprised of sensitive passive detection and active illumination. Passive detection had been demonstrated in field tests to provide detection and identification of IED trigger electronic devices at range. The ability to further actively perturb the signatures of the devices and further demonstrate that improved detection is thereby possible has also been demonstrated.
Emission signatures also provide valuable information regarding the potential susceptibility and vulnerability of the systems to electromagnetic (EM) energy at those frequencies. Emission sources are often susceptible at the same frequencies where they emit. Antennas, apertures, through reciprocally are generally both good transmitters and good receivers. Cables, circuit traces, antennas typically emit and receive at same frequencies. From a system standpoint, EM energy that efficiently propagates from the device is often efficiently received by the device.
Some knowledge of the emitting frequencies may be leveraged offensively and some examples are outlined below.
The introduction of EM field strengths at select frequencies where the device is measured to be emitting, suitable to cause failure, degradation or temporary disruption may amplify and/or alter the unintentional radiation characteristics of the device. Damaged semiconductors, which are determined by breakdown characteristics, for instance may radiate robustly. The characteristic signatures of a specific device may be easier to pick out of the noise. The signature changes might be leveraged in numerous ways.
The introduction of EM field strengths at select frequencies suitable to cause failure, degradation or temporary disruption may amplify and/or alter the unintentional radiation characteristics of the device. Damaged semiconductors, determined by breakdown characteristics, for instance may radiate robustly. The characteristic signatures of a specific device may be easier to pick out of the noise. The signature changes might be leveraged in numerous ways. Some benefits might be: amplification of the emission signature when semiconductor components are degraded may improve the ability to detect, identify and track the emitter
Field strengths sufficient to cause the described signature enhancement could be introduced through non-lethal technologies such as high-power microwave (HPM) or electromagnetic pulse (EMP) sources or other high power microwave sources (jammer, radars, stand-off weapons) that were designed for other applications in the field.
The field strengths necessary to cause the described responses may not have to be so robust. Lower field strengths in some cases may alter circuit function substantially. For example, oscillator instabilities at low field strengths can significantly alter the emission signature of such devices.
In geographical regions where background emissions are minimized by a lack of electronics among the local population there may be greater potential to leverage such techniques.
In tight packed cities non-lethal RF devices may be used to amplify emissions signatures to better track electronics, an individual or gather other useful information. An example would be proximity RF/HPM source directed towards a building. If the signature being tracked changes one would gain information about the occupants or contents of the building.
The integration of passive emission collection techniques and offensive RF strategies have synergies that when integrated and utilized efficiently may improve the remote location of electronics and individuals that have dependency on electronic equipment.